Abstract The frequently anecdotal nature of evidence concerning the impact of warfare on conservation poses numerous problems and there have been calls to apply a strict set of conditions to such data to improve the rigor of scientific analysis in this field. To illustrate the difficulties, however, of applying strict quantitative conditions on such data a deterministic model of conflict-linked deforestation in sub-Saharan Africa was constructed and the implications of the model discussed. Our model indicates that from 1990-2005 approximately 35,000 ha of timber have been used to support officially recorded UN refugees in this region: this is a continuing impact, albeit quantified using data with some potential error. An alternative semiquantitative approach was also used, with reported environmental impacts of conflict assessed for reliability and severity using a number of empirical criteria. Data focusing on the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda were subsequently analysed using this framework. Illegal resource exploitation was identified as the primary impact resulting from conflict and, in some instances, a driver of the hostilities. From the joint consideration of the conflict and post-conflict phases such exploitation is concluded to be the product of lawlessness and anarchy generated by violent uprisings rather than violence per se. As such, armed conflict does not pose a novel threat to protected areas but rather amplifies threats extant during peace, creating a need for appropriate responses by those involved in conservation management. With both the occurrence and violence of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa increasing, the impacts of warfare are pertinent to both the immediate and long-term management of biological resources in the region.
Introduction
Warfare inevitably has environmental impacts, whether intentional or accidental (Vanasselt, 2003) . Conflict may trigger mass movement of human populations, the decline or near total collapse of state functions and consequently a forced reliance on wild resources, and uncontrolled natural resource exploitation (Dudley et al., 2002; McNeely, 2003) . Designated protected areas can become targets for belligerents as a strategic resource for exploitation or defence, a potential source of equipment, or a resource for the displaced (Jacobs & Schloeder, 2001; Kalpers, 2001a; Dudley et al., 2002) .
Because of the difficulties of engaging in scientific research in a war zone (Shambaugh et al., 2000; Vanasselt, 2003 ) the availability of scientific or even pseudo-scientific data on the impact of warfare on conservation efforts is, at best, haphazard and, at worst, non-existent. In addition, the lack of clear spatial or temporal definition to conflict further hinders any rigorous assessment of its environmental impact.
Published analyses of warfare in an ecological context fall into two categories. The first reports specific events relating to a single conflict that are difficult to place into a wider context (Hatton et al., 2001) , and the second provides an overview of the type of impact that may be generated (Dudley et al., 2002) and tends to be simultaneously too broad to apply in a specific context. Brauer (2001) condemned many existing reviews as anecdotal, grossly unreliable, incomplete, difficult and complex to assess, lacking a classification of impacts by severity, and edited to support the politically correct result. Although these criticisms are valid, the issue of scientific data collection from zones of armed conflict remains intractable, with many logistical and ethical barriers to negotiate. As Brauer himself conceded, 'ignorance is not bliss', and the nature of the evidence should not be used to prevent further examinations of the environmental consequences of warfare.
Here we attempt to find a way between these two approaches, examining multiple conflicts in a single biogeographic region (sub-Saharan Africa). Because of the insidious and lengthy nature of pre-conflict tensions we consider only periods of active hostilities and the immediate post-conflict environment, with the latter considered to extend either to the onset of the subsequent conflict or to the installation of an internationally recognized ruling authority, whichever is sooner. We first use a quantitative approach to examine whether the ecological consequences of warfare can be examined in the rigorous manner advocated by Brauer (2001) , and we then use a semi-quantitative approach by examining the impacts of conflict in a case-study approach using a categorization of the severity of the effects and the reliability of the data.
We show that quantitative approaches, while limited by both lack of data and potential error, can demonstrate important and alarming trends in loss of natural resources. Our semi-quantitative approach identifies that warfare itself does not generally pose a novel threat to protected areas and endangered species, but rather amplifies threats which are ongoing during peace, or rather between periods of conflict. We discuss the challenges this brings to conservation management in one of the world's most important areas for biodiversity.
Armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-2001
One of the major failings of previous reviews of the effects of war on conservation efforts is the inadequate analysis of the characteristics of conflict. It is axiomatic that knowledge of the frequency, duration and nature of conflict experienced in a given locality is essential to comprehend the mechanisms by which the reported environmental impacts are produced. We therefore examined the history and distribution of conflict using the UN-supported public dataset that details warfare between 1955 and 2001 on a global scale (State Failure, 2001) . By calculating 'conflict years' in each country we found that the average nation in sub-Saharan Africa experienced 6.55 years of conflict between 1955 and 2001 ( Fig. 1 ) compared to the global average of 4.75 years, making it the most conflict-ridden continent. The temporal variation in the number of active conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa ranged from none in 1955 to .20 during the early 1990s. Conflict activity may be associated with major geopolitical events, such as decolonization during the late 1960s (Meredith, 2005) . A decadal breakdown of conflicts highlights a general escalation in frequency since 1960, with 18 conflicts in 1960-1969 and 23 in 1990-1999 . Conflict has also become increasingly severe, with the emergence of intense genocidal conflict in Sudan and Rwanda (Jennings, 2001) .
The majority of wars in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. 92% of those in 2000) have been civil conflicts fought within the boundaries of a single sovereign state (State Failure, 2001 ). However, internal wars are no less capable of having international consequences than transboundary conflict. A common feature of civil war is the mass displacement of people, and if this involves movement across an international border, a significant number of the ecological consequences of the conflict may be displaced into the recipient country, as seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (Elongo, 2000) . Equally, the unpredictable and unstructured nature of civil war, with the frequent emergence of new belligerent groups and shifting alliances, promotes frequent and repeated population displacements and a disparate security situation at anything above the immediately local level (Hart & Mwinyihali, 2001; Kalpers 2001a) . Furthermore, many of the legal codes governing the conduct of belligerents during warfare are not applicable where hostilities do not cross international boundaries (Austin & Bruch, 2003) . Thus, the international community has diminished capacity to censure the strategies and weaponry in use.
Quantitative assessment of the environmental impact of conflict
We constructed a deterministic model to demonstrate consequences of warfare for the environment and to highlight the severe curtailment of available knowledge inherent to the application of such a strict quantitative approach to data emerging from conflict zones. The model describes the only impact for which accurate data were available that could be directly linked to the armed conflict, namely timber usage by refugees in official UN refugee camps. Sources of data and potential errors are given in Table 1 . Nations in the study area were classified into three environmental types: semi-desert/ desert, savannah/grassland, and tropical forest. Using the average of timber consumption estimates during conflict in each of these categories, an average timber consumption value for each environmental type was calculated. This value was combined with annual estimates of the refugee population in each nation during 1990-2005 to yield an annual figure for national refugee-linked timber consumption. Using estimates of timber standing stock per ha for each nation, this figure was converted to the number of ha deforested per environmental type (Fig. 2) . The model is described by
where f ay1 is the area deforested (ha) in nation a in year 1 of the data set, R ay1 is number of refugees in year 1 in nation a, W e1 is wood used per capita in environment type e1, e2..., and T n1 is tonnage of timber per ha of nation a. The cumulative area of deforestation associated with UN refugees in the study nations during 1990-2005 (F) is given by F~(f ay1 z f ay2 z f ay3 ::: z f ayn ) z (f by1 z f by2 z f by3 ::: z f byn ) z ::::
where z is the last nation in the sample and yn is the last year.
There is an important caveat that must be attached to these calculations. Data on both the number of displaced persons and their timber consumption are estimates. For example, per capita timber consumption has been shown to vary widely according to the nature of the food rations and shelter provided by humanitarian organizations together with the cultural traditions and practices of the displaced population (Knudson, 2002; UNEP, 2005) . Thus, our model can only provide an indication of the likely magnitude of refugee-linked deforestation, rather than an absolute estimate. However the importance of the model is twofold. Firstly, it quantitatively highlights the potential for severe ecological impact that arises from a single highly specific activity amongst the many impacts that warfare can generate. Our model indicates that the equivalent of 34,984 ha of timber would have been necessary to support the number of refugees generated by conflict in sub-Saharan Africa during 1990-2005, and this only accounts for those refugees officially recorded by the UN. Secondly, the implications of the model are perhaps of greater importance than its findings. Using a quantitative paradigm, as advocated by Brauer (2001) , the substantial volume of data pertaining to the ecological consequences of warfare in sub-Saharan Africa (Appendix) is much reduced and has a margin of error that is probably large and is difficult to quantify (34,984 ¡ 5,143 ha, demonstrated by the diverging lines in Fig. 2 ). Notwithstanding the limitations of this approach, and the reduction of data that is inevitable, we have demonstrated the ongoing and increasing loss of a natural resource that, given a continuing trend for humanitarian crises in Africa, is unlikely to be reversed without considerable effort from the international community. Fig. 1 The duration of armed conflict in sub-Saharan African nations during 1955-2001. The frequency of armed conflict or severe civil strife was determined via the calculation of conflict years (the number of months for which a nation was recorded as being at war in the dataset, converted to years) using conflicts reported within the State Failure Dataset (State Failure, 2001) . Nations identified by this means as being particularly subject to prolonged warfare were Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Somalia, DRC and Mozambique. The study included all mainland African nations whose southern boundary lies below that of true desert, excluding only Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Western Sahara.
Semi-quantitative assessment of the environmental impact of conflict
Given the limitations of a quantitative assessment of the environmental impact of conflict we explore the possibility of using a semi-quantitative assessment. We developed two criteria, Severity and Reliability (Table  2) , to assess the impact of reported conflicts. Severity provides an indication of the magnitude, duration and ecological effects of the impact, and Reliability amalgamates data reliability, comprehensiveness and potential bias. In addition, data were classified according to the Lanier-Graham (1993) system, which categorizes the environmental impacts of warfare according to the intentions and status (civilian or military) of its perpetrators. The data are complex to assess, an inherent aspect of analysing reports from a politically unstable region in which long-term records and monitoring programmes are scarce.
We assessed 187 records of the environmental impact of warfare in 10 African nations published between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2005 (Appendix). Illegal hunting of mammal species accounted for 57.8% of reported cases and the average Severity of this was scored as Major. Impacts resulting in deforestation, although numerically smaller than hunting-linked impacts, were of comparable severity. Thus, it appears that reviews of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa have focused on a subset of the total range of reported impacts. The reasons for this are unclear. The environmental impact of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa is seldom the product of direct or indirect military activity (Table 3) . Rather, the majority of impacts are perpetrated by non-military personnel as a reaction to the changing socioeconomic conditions created by the conflict.
The environmental impact of warfare was not reported equally across the 10 nations, with the greatest proportion (75.4%) of information available for DRC and Rwanda. The environmental impact of conflicts in these two countries was comparable to the wider survey and we therefore confine further discussion to these two countries. The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 is estimated to have involved the murder of 800,000 civilians and the international displacement or impoverishment of a further 4 million (Kanyamibwa, 1998; Jennings, 2001) . The relationship between the Rwandan crisis and the subsequent Congolese conflict is complex. The influx of refugees in 1994 remained as a displaced diaspora in DRC for several years, exacerbated the pre-existing civil unrest, and eventually propagated conflict that endured for nearly a decade and involved nine other nations (Biswas & Tortajada-Quiroz, 1996; Sato et al., 2000; Hart & Mwinyihali, 2001; Lanjouw, 2001 ). The majority of UNHCR (1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2005, 2006a,b) No data for nations with ,1,000 refugees environmental impacts reported in Rwanda and DRC were the product of civilians exploiting, whether for need or greed, the breakdown of societal values and law enforcement (Kanyamibwa, 1998; Kanyamibwa & Chantereau, 2000; Kalpers, 2001b; Kalpers et al., 2003) rather than a consequence of deliberate military strategy. Only 4.8 and 6.6% of all reported impacts could be attributed to direct military activity in DRC and Rwanda, respectively. The military was, however, indirectly responsible for illegal resource exploitation in both nations, albeit on substantially different scales. Rwanda's Akagera 144 Table 2 Data significance assessment criteria. Severity constitutes a measure of the significance of the ecological impact of warfare-related alterations (whether beneficial or deleterious) to protected areas; overall severity was determined by the assessment of individual categories. If an impact scored mostly 1, the overall severity was scored as Minor, mostly 2 as Moderate, and mostly 3 as Major. Reliability is an indicator of the nature of the data source.
Category
Code Criteria National Park was used as a strategic base by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Kanyamibwa, 1998; Plumptre et al., 2001) . Despite no evidence of direct strategy to target the park's resources, a number of environmental impacts occurred as a by-product of the military activity in the region. The proliferation of armed personnel with inadequate food rations caused an upsurge in hunting activity and by the end of 1990 a 60-90% loss of ungulates and other mammals from the Park was reported (ACNR in Kanyamibwa, 1998; William & Ntayomba, 1999 in Plumptre et al., 2001 . The various rebel movements involved in the Congolese conflict engaged in illegal resource exploitation, in particular of columbo-tantalite, or coltan, to finance their campaign and acquire wealth. A marked increase in the global coltan price in late 2000 led to the widespread mining of the ore by the militias and their affiliates within the boundary of Kahuzi-Biega National Park and greatly increased pressure on scant local protein resources (Redmond, 2001) . Civilians, and in particular refugees, were found to be responsible for the majority of reported environmental impacts in both Rwanda (87.0%) and DRC (87.4%). Large-scale humanitarian assistance camps for displaced Rwandans existed in the vicinity of two World Heritage Sites in eastern DRC during 1994-1995. These camps were found to account for 48% of all reported impacts in DRC, despite existing for less than a third of the study period.
Given the identity of those responsible it is unsurprising that impacts were focused on the exploitation of the two resources essential for survival, food and timber. In the DRC deforestation has been cited as the most frequent and significant environmental impact. We found, however, that illegal hunting had similar severity and a higher reporting frequency. This apparent disparity may be the product of a lower reporting threshold for those impacts that involve charismatic mammal species.
Arguably the most charismatic species to be affected by the conflicts in DRC and Rwanda is the gorilla Gorilla spp. which accounted for 10.2% of all 187 environmental impacts reported. Populations of both the eastern lowland gorilla Gorilla berengei graueri and the mountain gorilla Gorilla berengei berengei were affected in four protected areas. Within the DRC the reporting frequency of impacts was equal for the eastern lowland and mountain gorilla populations at 47.4% of the total each. The remaining reported impacts did not specify which subspecies was affected. Spatial disparities in the frequency of reported impacts were, however, apparent. As reported elsewhere (Yamagiwa, 2003 ) the gorilla population in Parc National des Virunga was relatively unscathed by the conflict, accounting for 26.3% of all reported impacts relating to gorillas. In contrast, the equivalent figure for Parc National du Kahuzi-Biega was 52.6%. This result is indicative of the high levels of spatial disparity in the impacts of conflict. There is evidence to suggest that protected areas may be compartmentalized with certain strategic areas seriously affected by conflict and others remaining comparatively undisturbed (Elongo, 2000) .
While the Rwandan genocide was one of the most serious conflicts, in terms of civilian casualties, to have occurred in Africa (State Failure, 2001) , no simultaneous escalation in the reported ecological impact is apparent, which would be anticipated if the level of violence in a fractious society was directly translated into ecological effects. Few impacts were reported during 1994 within the boundaries of Rwanda despite the majority of human casualties being recorded during April-May 1994. Evidence from DRC suggests this is not an isolated phenomenon but rather that the environmental impact of conflict is not a simple product of the gun. The propensity of civil conflicts to propagate mass civilian displacement, together with the documented importance of refugees in the environmental impact signature of such conflict, creates substantial spatial displacement of environmental impacts, frequently across international boundaries. For example, 54% of the impacts reported in DRC during 1994-1997 were linked to the presence of sizeable camps for Rwandan nationals in North and South Kivu. Similarly, the environmental impacts reported in Garamba National Park in northern DRC have been linked both to the Congolese civil conflict and those in both Sudan and Uganda. Mercenaries from Sudan and Uganda have been implicated in the illegal exploitation of the last remaining wild population of northern white rhino Ceratotherium simum cottoni, with revenues from the sale of horn used to fund activities in their home countries (IUCN, 2004; Anon., 2005; Anthony, 2006) . The Garamba population was stable, albeit small, between 1998 (the outbreak of the second Congolese civil war) and June 2003 (IUCN, 2004) . However, the population had declined by 50-74% by 2004, with only 5-10 individuals remaining in the wild (IUCN, 2004; Anon., 2005) . The most recent census data indicate that the current population comprises no more than four individuals (Anthony, 2006) . The recent upsurge in hunting serves to highlight the potential for the temporal displacement of the environmental impacts of conflict.
During 2004 and 2005 peace talks were underway in both DRC and Sudan. The hiatus in conflict led to large numbers of mercenaries in the vicinity of Garamba with little other occupation (IUCN, 2004) . Unsurprisingly, illegal hunting for commercial profit commenced, exploiting the trading routes to the Arab peninsula and northern Africa that had previously been blocked by armed conflict (Anthony, 2006) .
Temporal displacement of environmental impacts into the immediate post-conflict period is a consistent feature of African conflicts. The lawlessness that permits induced environmental impacts during conflict does not evaporate upon the declaration of peace but rather recedes gradually as state and civil society are reconstructed (Kayanja & Douglas-Hamilton, 1984; Hatton et al., 2001) . In many of the protected areas of DRC reports of illegal exploitation and adverse environmental impacts increased after peace negotiations, and in Rwanda impacts were reported long after the official cessation of conflict (Fig. 3) . The presence of the French military in Nyungwe Forest Reserve prevented much ecological impact from the genocide and civil war (Jennings, 2001; Plumptre et al., 2002) but during the post-war period this immunity ceased, with increasing resource pressure exerted by the local community (Plumptre, 2003) , and the incidence of poaching increased markedly with 300-400 snares removed from the reserve per month (Plumptre et al., 2001) . Similarly, few deaths of the flagship mountain gorilla can be directly attributed to the Rwandan civil war but rather to reduced likelihood of legal consequences during the reconstruction period (Plumptre et al., 1997) . In DRC the year-long ceasefire between conflicts had a significantly higher frequency of reported environmental impacts than the average year of the conflict that followed (U 5 66, P ,0.01; Mann-Whitney U Test) but this could be due to better communications and access for the media.
The increase in illegal resource exploitation in protected areas during both conflict and its immediate aftermath is the product of a breakdown of government infrastructure and, in particular, the inability of conservation staff to act in protected areas. The continued active management of protected areas by conservation staff has been suggested as a means by which the adverse impacts of conflict may be reduced (Kayanja & Douglas-Hamilton, 1984; Lanjouw, 2001; Plumptre, 2003) . In both DRC and Rwanda conservation activity is heavily dependent upon international funding, whether from donors or tourists, both of whom are highly sensitive to the emergence of armed conflict (Shambaugh et al., 2000) .
Donors frequently categorize conservation-related activities as non-essential or low priority projects (Wabbes-Candotti, 2000) . Prior to conflict, the withdrawal or suspension of expedient conservation initiatives may be employed as a warning of greater sanctions to come. Similarly, post-conflict funding is frequently directed toward humanitarian and infrastructure repair projects prior to being directed at conservation. Thus, conservation activities may feel the effects of the conflict for considerably longer than other economic sectors, lengthening the period during which illegal resource exploitation is difficult to curb. In both Rwanda and DRC a number of major donors suspended their conservation support in the early 1990s as tensions in the region increased (Wabbes-Candotti, 2000; Plumptre et al., 2001) . Despite the short-lived nature of the Rwandan conflict, which ceased in 1995, only the German Technical Development Agency had reinstated funds by 2001 (Plumptre et al., 2001) . Similarly, this was the only bilateral donor to maintain funding during the Congolese conflict. A pilot project by the UN and Fauna & Flora International to provide emergency funds for protected area management during conflict may provide a means by which some of the environmental impacts of conflict could be curtailed (FFI, 2006) .
Discussion
The study of the ecological consequences of warfare becomes reliant on a much reduced data set if only strictly quantitative data are considered. As illustrated in our initial quantitative analysis, all data emerging from war zones would have to fulfill three criteria to meet Brauer's (2001) requirements for quantitative analysis. Firstly, the data should consist of a pre-war baseline and a post-war survey as a minimum, with regular in-conflict surveys preferable. Secondly, the data should be related directly to the conflict, either presenting a novel impact not present during times of political stability, or create a measurable change in existing threats that is directly attributable to the conflict. Thirdly, the data need to be correlated directly to some reliable quantitative characteristic of the conflict, such as the number of casualties or the number of refugees. As we have illustrated, fulfillment of all three criteria is a formidable, if not impossible, task.
If African nations experiencing conflict in 2005 alone are considered, the environmental protection and conservation capacity of nine nations was directly affected by conflict (Marshall & Gurr, 2005) . The impacts of a conflict may overspill its defined boundaries, affecting both a nation and its neighbours for substantial lengths of time (Commission for Africa, 2005) . Assuming that each of those nine conflicts has created refugee flows into at least one of its neighbours, 30% of nations in subSaharan Africa were subject to conflict-linked environmental degradation in 2005 alone. Thus, while war zones are an abnormal environment in which to conduct scientific research, conflict and upheaval is becoming a normal circumstance for an increasing number of nations. The importance of understanding the impacts of conflict upon the environment is such that it may be necessary to knowingly sacrifice normally accepted standards of data quality, with appropriate caveats, in return for an increased ability to evaluate the impacts of, and our responses to, each crisis as it develops. However, creating a systematic assessment framework to satisfy Brauer's criteria was a valuable exercise, highlighting a number of the characteristics of the environmental impact of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa that may be used to improve the response of the international conservation community.
The impacts of warfare are many and varied, mirroring the nature of the conflicts themselves (Hart & Mwinyihali, 2001; Draulans & van Krunkelsven, 2002; Dudley et al., 2002) . Modern armed conflict in subSaharan Africa does not usually directly target ecological resources in pursuit of a military outcome but rather those impacts are a by-product of its occurrence (Biswas & Tortajada-Quiroz, 1996; Kalpers, 2001a; Draulans & van Krunkelsven, 2002; Dudley et al., 2002) . The typical impacts of warfare in the region are those of illegal resource exploitation (Elongo, 2000; Redmond, 2001; UNOCHA, 2004) , which are not directly linked to military activity itself but to the emergent properties of conflict, lawlessness and anarchy. The environmental impact of contemporary conflict in the region may be viewed as a dichotomy, linked either to the provision of finance for military operations or the humanitarian needs of the disrupted civilian population. During intense conflict, however, the opportunities for resource exploitation may be limited, with trading routes inaccessible and the risk of personal injury high. In both Rwanda and DRC adverse environmental impacts were greatest in relatively calm but lawless periods and locations. It is therefore important to minimize the period of lawlessness in protected areas and in so doing reduce the opportunity for illegal resource exploitation.
The eruption of armed conflict in the midst of internationally backed conservation projects almost inevitably leads to the immediate partial or, in many cases, total withdrawal of support (Wabbes-Candotti, 2000; Wit, 2000) . The actions of donors, not only in withdrawing support but also in failing to reinstate it as soon as active hostilities cease, is a substantial component in propagating the damage to the protected areas of the region. International donors must respond more effectively and strategically to the relationship between conflict and biodiversity conservation in sub-Saharan Africa (Wabbes-Candotti, 2000) .
